Introduction
On
August 10, 1920, exactly a century ago, the political fate of the Kurdish
nation along with its territory, Kurdistan were on the line, after the Allied
Powers asserted their interest in national rights to self-determination
following World War I (WWI). President Wilson wrote in his Fourteen Points for
World Peace in January 1918: "[t]he Turkish portions of the present
Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but other nationalities
which are now under Turkish administration should be assured an undoubted
security of life and an unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."
On November 9, 1918 in a joint declaration, Britain and France promised
"the complete and final liberation of the peoples" who had been long
oppressed by the Turks, through "native governments and
administrations." These arrangements were to be established when nations,
of "their own free will" would act upon "the principles of
self-determination."
However,
pursuant to the peace treaties, several territories were demarcated without
consulting their peoples. In contrast, the drawing of states' boundaries in
Europe took place mostly along national lines. Self-determination via
sovereignty was thus in practice a Eurocentric concept, whereas in the Middle
East self-determination meant self-government rather than
internationally-recognized statehood. The result has been an untenable
diversity across regions affected by the War in the varieties of
self-determination, continuing to the present, suggesting that some peoples'
nationhood is less legitimate than that of others.
By
1920, self-determination was being realized only internally within states,
whereby minorities were entitled to maintain their separate identities through
guaranteed linguistic, cultural, and religious rights, but were not given full
sovereignty. Minorities' rights were included in the Covenant of the League of
Nations as a result of this fall-back from sovereign self-determination. In
contrast, the principle of self-determination was not addressed at all in the
Covenant of the League of Nations. Instead it created the Mandate System, in
which "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves" were entrusted to
"advanced nations" in Article 22. Self-determination after the War
thus became a principle that only applied to some, based on racial, religious,
and cultural criteria.
The Treaty of Sèvres (1920): National Self-Determination Within
Reach
Since
the Treaty of Zuhab (Qasr-e Shirin) in 1639, which integrated the Kurdistan
region into the Ottoman and Persian Empires, the Kurds have proactively sought
to create an independent territorial state of Kurdistan. The secret Sykes-Picot
deal (May 15-16, 1916) among Britain, France, and Tsarist Russia created new
boundaries for the peoples of the Middle East, although these frontiers were
recognized neither by the United States nor by the Bolsheviks. By that deal,
Kurdistan would have been partitioned into British, French, and
Russian-administered zones, as well as the Persian sphere. Upon Russia's
retreat and forfeiture of all its claims, and pursuant to the deal of December
23, 1917 between France and Britain, Kurdistan was assigned to the
"English zone' of 'influence."
After
WWI, at the Inter-departmental Conference of February 23, 1920, France proposed
"a partition of Kurdistan between the British and the French … and the
setting up of a federal organization." Owing to the lack of a unified
position within the British government, Lord Curzon, chairing the Conference,
announced the British withdrawal from Kurdistan, paving the way for Kurdistan
"to form itself into an autonomous State," with the Turks evacuating
from "all Kurdish areas." The Conference held that "the final
decision on the future of Kurdistan would depend on the conclusion of the
[Paris] Peace Conference." The Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sèvres
(the Treaty), the outcome of that conference, on August 10, 1920.
Article
62 of the Treaty (Section III, Kurdistan) empowered a commission of British,
French, Italian, Persian, and Kurdish representatives to determine any changes
in the Ottoman frontier. It also empowered another commission composed of a
delegation of British, French, and Italian officials to draft within six months
"a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east
of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia …, and north of the
frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia …." In Article 63, Turkey
agreed to "accept and execute the decisions of both the Commissions …
within three months."
Under
Article 64, within one year of the coming into force of the Treaty, Kurds would
attain "independence from Turkey" by popular majority if desired and
if they obtained the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. Upon Turkey's
renunciation of "all rights and title over these areas," Kurds
"in the Mosul vilayet" (Southern Kurdistan) could "adhere"
to the "independent Kurdish State." The Treaty also required that
Turkey abandon "all rights of suzerainty or jurisdiction of any kind over
Moslems who are subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other
State." However, despite major nationalist movements, the Kurds of Eastern
Kurdistan (i.e., in Persia) were not considered candidates for
self-determination, since Britain respected the territorial integrity of Persia
(later Iran) under the Anglo-Persian treaty of August 9, 1919, subverting any
chance of a "United Kurdistan" and thereby retaining significant
British authority over Persian land, customs, and oil resources.
The
Kurdish areas specified in the Treaty did not include all of the region's
Kurds, for the Treaty did not affect Kurdish territory in Syria, or Armenia.
Moreover, a flimsy government in Istanbul could not implement the Sèvres
provisions. Turkish nationalists agreed that three Kurdish sanjaks in Northern
Kurdistan should, by way of popular vote, determine their status, "if
necessary." In a letter to the Turks on March 12, 1921, Britain undermined
its earlier call for an "independent Kurdish State," indicating that
"in regard to Kurdistan the Allies would be prepared to consider a
modification of the Treaty … in conformity with the existing facts of the
situation, on condition of facilities for local autonomies and the adequate
protection of Kurdish … interests."
In
October 1921, Britain proclaimed an Arab government in Iraq. One month later,
the Provisional National Government of Iraq was set up under British control,
with local Kurdish governors at Kirkuk and Arbil. The Cairo Conference (March
1921) established the "Anglo-Kurdish" mandate, whereby Kurds would be
a "minority" within Iraq until they espoused the formation of a new
state. Meanwhile, Churchill and Major Edward W.C. Noel still vigorously
advocated an independent Kurdistan. Noel tacitly observed that the "goal
of an independent Kurdistan … can now be easily attained." The Kurds also
considered "federation under British protection," until a Kurdish
representative body opted for inclusion in the new state.
The
Turkish nationalists prevailed against the Allies on several fronts. France
ceded its territories to Turkey with the Treaty of Ankara. Ataturk and France
set new boundaries on October 20, 1921, and Western Kurdistan (Rojava) became
part of the French Mandate of Syria. The Turkish Grand National Assembly
granted "autonomous administration for the Kurdish nation in harmony with
their national customs" on February 10, 1922. However, in practice
autonomous administration never materialized. The separate states of Syria and
Lebanon coalesced under a French mandate, and Iraq under British tutelage.
Britain recognized Amir Faysal as the King of Iraq, in the Treaty of Alliance
of October 10, 1922, and Iraq attained independence in 1931.
In
Turkey, the Kemalists did not abide by the Treaty of Sèvres and the Allies
failed to forcibly enforce it. Under the Armistice of Mudanya between Britain
and the Turks on October 11, 1922, the Treaty of Sèvres was submitted for
renegotiation at Lausanne. Kurdistan hung in the balance. During the Lausanne
negotiations, the Turks still regarded the Kurds as a distinct ethnicity, but
then deviated from this policy. The Treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923,
recognized "Turkey" as an independent state, and pursuant to the
Treaty of Angora between Britain, Turkey, and Iraq on June 5, 1926, the
Iraqi-Turkish border was established and Mosul (Southern Kurdistan) became part
of Iraq, with a ten percent share of the oil resources given to Turkey for 25
years. Kurdistan was thus appended to the sovereign states of Iran, Iraq,
Syria, and Turkey, negating the Kurds' interests and their collective national
aspirations.
No
political or cultural rights were afforded to the Kurds in any of these new states,
despite pledges made by the International Commission of Inquiry (1925) instituted
by the Council of the League. The ending of the French mandate in the Levant
and Syria's independence in the 1940s again occurred without any change to the
Kurds' rights. Thus, self-determination or even democratic governance remained
a chimera.
The Self-Determination of Peoples
After
WWI, the Allied Powers had no interest in demands for self-determination due to
the economic and strategic importance of their colonies; self-determination had
amounted only to a convenient slogan which was perverted as well as exploited
through the Mandate system as an instrument for achieving the goal of
expansionism. In reality, the desire for power determined the fate of other peoples
and territories. Consent of the major powers was critical for any border
change. Concurrently, the Committee of Jurists and Commission of Rapporteurs of
the Åland Islands refused to recognize self-determination as a universal legal
norm because it did not appear in the Covenant of the League of Nations and was
"not, properly speaking a rule of international law". Rather,
self-determination was perceived as a political concept for enforcing justice
and safeguarding liberty, established by a "vague and general
formula". The Committee maintained that international law, as such, does
not allow national entities to secede from a state. Instead, they were entitled
to internal self-determination in the form of autonomy or self-governance to
maintain their separate ethnic identities or through effective guarantees of
certain linguistic, cultural, and religious rights. Developments with regard to
Kurdistan make this clear.
The
aftermath of World War II and the creation of the United Nations led to a shift
in thought from national self-determination to peoples' self-determination.
That is, the concept of self-determination was now to be invoked by the whole
people of a state, not by an ethno-culturally homogeneous minority. It took the
form of self-government. The UN's second decade starting in the mid-1950s saw a
call to end colonization. Consistent with Article 1 of the 1966 Human Rights
Covenants, self-determination mutated from a decolonization principle to a
post-colonial right, bestowed also on peoples of formerly colonial territories.
But the Kurds had already been split up among decolonized states. They did not
fit into the decolonization framework, as they did not occupy a discrete
colonial territory. Instead, their host states themselves acquired independence
and statehood, ostensibly on their behalf.
Conclusion
Kurds
were acknowledged as a socio-political nation at the end of WWI, when
self-determination had not yet been codified into a legally defined right.
However, Kurdish independence would have negatively affected the Allies'
political and economic interests, and the League of Nations accordingly
abandoned its support for Kurdish independence.
Instead,
the Kurds were partitioned into minorities in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey,
and are now the largest stateless nation in the world. Kurdistan was thus
effectively dismembered, and without the consent of the Kurdish people, the
sovereignty of new nation-states was imposed on them. The historico-legal
records on the Kurds indicate that the British government's termination of the
Treaty of Sèvres proved decisive in dividing Kurdistan. Ultimately, Kurdish
statehood was sacrificed—while sovereignty was deemed suitable for Europe, the
Allied Powers decided the fate of the peoples in the Middle East (i.e.,
alien-determination rather than self-determination). Kurds are not even
recognized as minorities with associated rights and are unrepresented in most
governments. After eight decades of suppression by the Iraqi government, the
2005 Iraqi Constitution granted the Kurds their only constitutionally
autonomous region, governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Other
states similarly failed to recognize the Kurds despite ethnic differences in
fictitiously homogeneous states. As a result, Kurds are deprived of the right
to participate effectively in public affairs and decision-making over matters
that directly affect them.
The
application of contemporary law on self-determination to the Kurds should be
clear, as the Kurds are the paradigm of a distinct people who would benefit
from self-determination because of their well-defined peoplehood. Internal
self-determination as a minority group within multiple states limits the Kurds
in terms of political autonomy, or even unity as a nation. The withdrawal of
support for self-determination during the 1920s was echoed by the United
States' decision to abandon democratic confederalism in the Kurdish region of Rojava
in Syria in the face of the Turkish incursion, on the centennial of the Treaty
of Sèvres. The Kurds have arguably not received the treatment they deserve, not
only from the major powers, but also their host states. To this day, Kurds
continue to lack recognized status and are still denied a sovereign state of
their own. This calls into question the actual strength of the legal principle
of self-determination.